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Volatile and rising global fuel prices present a tremendous challenge to our 
energy-dependent economy, and the ramifications are especially great for low-income 
households. Residential weatherization programs represent a tremendous opportunity to 
shield vulnerable populations, but the allocation of funding and assessment of efficacy 
has historically been fraught with political and procedural hurdles. This report examines 
the methods of assessing the efficacy of low-income weatherization and proposes a set of 
best practices.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of sustainability for low income households is at the nexus of two of my 
personal and professional passions. I spent several years in nonprofit program 
development in New Orleans between 2004 and 2008, designing and supporting 
programs that addressed issues of educational equity, workforce development, and 
environmental justice. In that role I was able to see both the potential for these programs 
to do tremendous good in the community juxtaposed against what as often a gross 
ismanagement of public resources and massive missed opportunities.  
New Orleans is an old American city blessed with an incredible architectural 
heritage, and residents of all backgrounds can be found living in historic, handcrafted 
houses dating from the turn of 20
th
 century. An unfortunate downside to this is that while 
these houses were built to provide the best cooling techniques available at the time, an air 
tunnel through a sequence of rooms facilitated by high ceilings and transoms, they are not 
at all equipped to act as the airtight heat envelops assumed by the manufacturers of 
modern air conditioning systems. As a consequence the utility bills of residents tend to be 
extremely high, especially in times of high natural gas prices when fuel costs were passed 
on to ratepayers.  
At such times our community centers would see a large influx of clients applying 
for assistance on their bills. Our case managers would triage these families‟ financial 
problems and negotiate bill forbearance or forgiveness with Entergy, the local utility, but 
we were only treating the symptom of a problem that was guaranteed to continue to 
surface. In my experience in most rental houses the transoms and large windows had long 
since been painted shut, and in the sweltering, humid Gulf Coast summers air 
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conditioning is a necessity rather than a luxury, especially for the elderly or those with 
small children.    
In the summer of 2005 New Orleans proved to be a microcosm representing the 
challenges of an inefficient consumption of fossil fuels to the poor and the consequences 
of anthropogenic climate change. Prices for natural gas, a baseload power fuel source in 
New Orleans, were steadily climbing as temperatures reached record highs. In the 
community center where I was working as a GED math tutor, St. Mary of the Angels in 
New Orleans 9
th
 Ward neighborhood, staff was working overtime and bringing in 
volunteers to handle the case load of clients seeking mediation with Entergy. At the time 
it seemed that the best we could do was pray for cooler weather and cheaper gas prices. 
In late August of 2005 the 9
th
 Ward was completely submerged in the floodwaters 
following Katrina, and in the Lower-9
th
 Ward hundreds of houses were literally torn from 
their foundations when the floodwall of the Industrial Canal broke under the pressure of 
the storm surge. Obviously no single climactic event can be attributed to anthropogenic 
climate change, but there is an undeniably ominous undercurrent in the image of an 
historic American city, particularly one whose 20
th
 century prosperity was driven by oil 
and gas, as the scene of unprecedented destruction of the sort experts warn will be 
exacerbated by global climate change. The ill-fated industrial canal that bisected the 9
th
 
Ward was overwhelmed by a storm surge that coursed through the erstwhile Mississippi 
Rive-Gulf Outlet (MR-GO), a shipping channel connecting the heart of the area‟s 
refining operating to offshore rigs in the Gulf.  
I am fascinated by New Orleans and the Louisiana Gulf Coast as a symbol of the 
paradox of prosperity and instability in our modern energy systems. The boom-bust 
nature of the commodities capitalism that has dominated the American Deep South for 
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centuries has always been a double edged sword for its people. From the brutally labor-
intensive King Cotton and sugarcane to the often ecologically devastating petroleum 
extraction and production the brunt of the consequences has always been borne by the 
poorest people.  
Nowhere was this paradox more evident than in St. Bernard Parish, a suburban 
and rural community wedged between the MR-GO and the Mississippi River. When the 
storm surge swept over the refineries the Chalmette Vista neighborhood was covered in a 
six-inch thick coating of crude oil. I was present at Our Lady of Prompt Succor Catholic 
Church after mass one Sunday when the Louisiana Bucket Brigade, an environmental 
justice organizing group partially funded through my office with funds from the Catholic 
Campaign for Human Development, presented the results of soil testing that they 
performed in backyards, playgrounds and other public spaces after the clean-up was 
completed. The expert presenting the information tried to remain objective about the risks 
accompanying the high levels of heavy metals and refining compounds found in the soil, 
but upon persistent and pointed questioning from a mother he conceded that he 
personally would not live in the community if he had young children. The mood in the 
crowded church gym was subdued, even resigned. The refineries and offshore rigs were 
the livelihood of the working class families of this community, and as one pastor put it in 
a private conversation, “I can‟t browbeat people on Sunday about how they feed their 
children the rest of the week.” 
For New Orleans and the rest of the world our modern energy systems are not 
sustainable. We use too much non-replenishable fuels in ways that fray the ecological and 
climactic fabric into which our lives and economies are inextricably interwoven. In the 
years of rebuilding following the storm many members of the community sought to 
address the problems of inefficient residential energy consumption along with 
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reconstruction and job training. Louisiana Green Corps, an organization largely funded 
through the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP), trained young women and men 
in light carpentry and energy auditing skills by weatherizing low-income homes, the very 
issue that I had been introduced to in the months prior to Katrina.  
I helped the organization with their fundraising and operations planning and 
helped them conceptualize a marketing strategy to eventually bring in higher-end 
residential customers. The synergy of this program, providing job training, addressing the 
root of the symptom of high utility bills, and reducing the natural resource consumption 
of New Orleans home, greatly appealed to me. I was somewhat surprised and frustrated, 
however, that we did not attempt to measure the impact of the program on clients‟ 
households in a meaningful way. It seemed to me a critical measure of the positive 
impact of our work, and furthermore a relatively straightforward metric to estimate. Like 
many nonprofit programs the Green Corps was understaffed and overworked, so I did not 
take issue with their inability to perform the analysis in-house, but I was very surprised 
that there were no apparent data-gathering systems aimed at collecting the information 
necessary to determine offset energy usage as a result of their intervention. 
The focus of my work in graduate school has been the economics of 
sustainability, and I had the privilege in the Spring of 2010 to take a practicum course in 
Sustainable Housing with Professor Peter Ward of the LBJ School of Public Affairs. 
Through this course was able to explore the case for sustainable housing interventions in 
depth, as well as develop a framework for the microeconomic analysis of the decision 
making regarding such interventions. While our team was examining the best practices 
for sustainable housing interventions, bureaucratic gridlock on the national level was 
throwing into high relief the issues of inefficiency and missed opportunities that has 
plagued their implementation for decades. The funding allocated for the Weatherization 
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Assistance Program as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), or 
„stimulus act,‟ was trickling slowly through the federal and state systems, with only a 
small fraction of funds having been put to work a year after its passage. 
The roadblocks on the national level were mostly procedural and administrative, 
but what they exposed was a lack of focus regarding the policy goals of low-income 
weatherization, and an inconsistent understanding as to how to judge their efficacy of 
implementation. The clarity I developed regarding the merits of sustainability 
interventions explored by our practicum team combined with my frustration with the 
national-level policy failure inspired me to research the issue at length for my capstone 
professional report. In this professional report I set out to determine how policies and 
program supporting low income residential sustainability interventions ought to be 
evaluated an implemented. 
Scope of the Report 
To begin with, I would like to review several important topics that this paper does 
not cover. This report is not an engineering or architectural report. I do not review 
specific interventions and weigh their benefits and limitations under different conditions. 
I do not claim expertise in this topic, and would not presume to prescribe weatherization 
techniques for given housing types and climates. I do, however, cover in some detail 
methods through which policymakers may infer which techniques are most appropriate. 
Furthermore, this is not a program management manual. There are many high 
quality „best practices‟ guides for performance management and quality control of low-
income weatherization programs, covering topics such as personnel training, budgeting, 
and community outreach. These are worthy topics that were explored in the practicum, 
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however the focus of this report is on issues that would concern policy managers at a 
higher level of decision making.  
The problem that I noted in working with the Louisiana Green Corps, a lack of 
sufficient data collection to properly estimate energy savings, was only scratching the 
surface. Until very recently there has not been a nationwide attempt to quantify the 
benefits of public money spent on weatherization, and it is a stretch to say that many of 
the methods used in reporting have been good-faith attempts. In this report I will examine 
and critique the methods used to estimate energy savings from program such as WAP and 
identify appropriate frameworks for incorporating the data into decisions regarding the 
allocation of public money. Ultimately, this report is an attempt to clarify the role that 
rigorous, objective performance measurement in techniques can play in the assessment of 
NGOs with multiple, difficult to measure objectives. Using the Louisiana Green Corps as 
an example, few would assert that the short-term provision of green-collar job training is 
not a worthy enterprise, but the fact that no information exists as to the impact of 
weatherization on clients‟ homes means that success of the program in completing two 
facets of its mission, affordable energy usage and reduced resource consumption, is 
entirely speculative.  
As a both a former administrator of a grant program and a former grant-writer I 
am highly attenuated to the missed opportunities and misallocation of resources that are 
the result of insufficient performance measurement. Organizations that do great work but 
are unable to verify their impact are not competitive for large-scale funding, and what I 
would consider to be less worthy causes are often able to win support based solely on the 
persuasiveness of charismatic advocates. The affordability of the American lifestyle and 
efficient, sustainable use of natural resources are two of the most pressing challenges 
facing policymakers today, and we cannot gain any traction in addressing these issues if 
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without separating the wheat from the chafe in terms of community-based sustainability 
programs.  
I consider low-income residential energy efficiency and weatherization as a low-
hanging fruit and focus this report on it for several reasons. The first is that private sector 
energy efficiency and weatherization services are thriving with customers in the 
industrial and commercial sectors, and thus there is a significant existing literature on 
best practices for analyzing their efficacy. Second, of course, is my personal experience 
with the importance of finding long-term solutions for low-income families facing 
volatile utility bills. Finally, with the push to move the generation mix towards lower-
carbon, alternative energy and growing global demand for fuel commodities it may be 
reasonably estimated that the cost of energy will increase in the future, meaning that the 
burden of affordable energy consumption is likely to grow.  
In summary, the two main policy questions addressed in this paper are how to 
analyze the efficacy of residential energy efficiency programs and how to appropriately 
incorporate that data into a decision-making framework. The recommendations of this 
report will help policymakers create a framework to determine regional allocation of 
weatherization funds rather than local management of programs. 
 
Organization of the Report 
This report will review the policy logic of low income weatherization programs 
and review existing methods for measuring the benefits of these programs. Chapter 2 
explores the definition of sustainability, establishes the logic for narrow focus of benefits 
that may be monetized, and reviews the recent history of low-income sustainability 
policy. Chapter 3 is an overview of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) framework and 
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explores the special case of using CBA in a policy context. Chapter 4 is a technical 
overview and critique of the most prominent evaluation methods for residential 
weatherization programs, as well as an exploration of how the methods may be adapted 
for simple use by policymakers to establish a measure of benefits. Chapter 5 draws on the 
methodology established in the previous chapter to make more recommendations for the 

















CHAPTER 2. SUSTAINABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF LOW-
INCOME HOUSING 
Sustainability is a holistic term that may encompass financial, social, and 
environmental considerations. Its interpretation is highly sensitive to initial assumptions 
regarding the value of particular resources and the relevant time scale for the agent under 
consideration. Financial sustainability is by definition uniquely germane to the context of 
low-income housing, and housing interventions that stand on their economic benefits are 
the easiest to analyze and justify. Monetizing the benefits of efforts to improve social, 
environmental and health sustainability is a largely subjective task sensitive to biases and 
priors, and thus housing interventions that purport to produce these benefits are much 
more difficult to compellingly integrate into policy.  
Conceptualizing Benefits of Sustainability Interventions 
Given scarce resources policymakers must manage the tradeoff between making a 
significant impact for each household served and making an impact for the greatest 
number of households; the methods for measuring benefits will be the main driver as to 
how this balance is achieved. It is useful to utilize a taxonomy of sustainability 
intervention options that distinguishes between those which may be justified on their 
economic benefits alone, those which have no immediately apparent economic 
justification, and those which have a combination of an obvious economic benefit and a 
set of non-monetized and quality of life benefits.   
The first step in analyzing sustainability options is to separate the types of 
benefits which may be feasibly monetized and those which may not. The former lend 
themselves to a well-established set of analytical methods with near universal consensus 
as to their application and interpretation, whereas the latter are difficult to generalize and 
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may be subject to widely varying contextual interpretation. Quality of life improvements 
to households or neighborhoods, such as greenspace and parks, may lead to increased 
community interaction and undoubtedly have aesthetic value, but the monetary value of 
these benefits to individual households is very difficult to establish. 
Given that many sustainability interventions have significant quality of life 
impacts that are difficult to monetize a careful use of terms ought to be employed in order 
to avoid unduly disregarding viable options. Rather than refer to the „net present value‟ of 
an option, common parlance in the financial sector, this policy report will instead, where 
applicable, use the term „net expenditure‟ and define it as positive or negative. In practice 
this changes nothing but the sign of the value, but the conceptual difference is the 
expectation that the monetized benefits will most often fall short of the initial outlay. An 
agent making a decision about investing in housing interventions may consider the net 
expenditure the „true cost‟ rather than the initial outlay and adjust their decision based on 
their own personal willingness to pay for the expected quality of life or environmental 
benefits. This distinction is non-trivial, because in conventional CBA a negative net 
benefit automatically disqualifies a project from consideration, whereas individual 
consumers often make consumption decisions where the cost is known and the benefit is 
not quantitatively defined.  
Policies Affecting Low-Income Households 
TYPES OF POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
Low-income household service policies have historically been administered by 
local utilities, which have considered broader values than economic sustainability. Such 
policies historically have taken the form of energy assistance, weatherization, and 
consumer protection policies. Energy assistance policies are direct subsidies for energy 
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consumption for low-income ratepayers. Customers may pay a lower rate per kWh, 
receive a lump-sum grant, or take advantage of a special payment plan for abnormally 
large bills as might result from spikes in fuels costs or extreme weather events. In some 
cases utilities will pardon the debts of customers who demonstrate significant hardship. 
Consumer protection policies include delayed termination of services, non-termination 
covenants for certain seasons of the year, or even universal service policies1.  
Weatherization services most commonly entail direct investments in homes to 
increase the efficiency of energy consumption, but they also may include education 
regarding efficient energy usage and professional audits to determine what simple 
investments and behavioral changes might easily generate energy savings 2. 
Weatherization services are distinct from the other types of low-income residential 
sustainability polices in that they may be performed by any government agency or 
nonprofit, whereas energy assistance and consumer protection must be done in 
conjunction with the retail utility in order to be effective.  
A COMMENT ON POLICIES FOR POWER MARKET STRUCTURE 
There are a myriad of market structures for electric power in the United States, 
ranging from full vertical integration of a monopoly utility and power producer to a fully 
restructured market with both retail and wholesale deregulation. In a fully regulated 
market structure the monopoly utility negotiates with regulators to set a price per unit of 
electricity that covers capital and operating costs and provides a set return on equity. This 
fixed rate assumes a certain price level for fuel, and when fuel prices deviate from this 
                                                 
1 Houthhakker, H.S., Phillip K Verleger, Jr., and Dennis P. Sheehan.“Dynamic Demand Analysis for 
Gasoline and Residential Electricity.”American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 56, no. 2 (May, 
1974) . p. 250. 
 
2 Ibid. p. 250. 
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assumed level the balance is obtained from customers through a variable surcharge. In a 
fully restructured market competing power retailers offer service to end-use customers 
and purchase power from independent producers. Retail contracts are shorter term than 
the period of time between rate cases for monopoly producers, so the prices more directly 
reflect the state of power markets. Although price discovery follows different dynamics 
based on the market structures, in all cases prices are fundamentally driven by the 
marginal cost of producing a unit of electricity, and that cost is eventually borne by 
consumers of that electricity. 3  
The effects of restructuring on retail residential energy consumers is a 
controversial topic, so it is useful to review some of the concerns from the perspective of 
low-income ratepayers. Low-income customers are uniquely concerned with adequacy of 
service and the cost of power. 4 With regards to the former, restructuring at its most basic 
level will introduce more uncertainty into the financial planning of power retailers and 
will tend to put downward pressure their margins, affecting their ability to set aside funds 
for consumer protection policies. Regarding the latter, several dynamics introduced by 
restructuring have the potential to be especially problematic for low-income ratepayers. 
Since restructuring causes price-discovery to occur more quickly it is also more volatile, 
and low-income consumers will have less flexibility in absorbing this volatility. 
Furthermore, they may lack the market power or the savvy of commercial, industrial, or 
higher-income power customers and may at least fail to reap the benefits of restructuring, 
and perhaps bear a disproportionate share of power prices.5 
                                                 
3 Shively, Bob and John Ferrare. Understanding Today’s Electricity Business. (San Francisco: 
EnergyDynamics, 2008). p.126. 
4 Department of Health and Human Services. Monitoring the Impact of Electric Restructuring on Low-
Income Consumers: The What, How and Why of Data Collection. June 1999. Online. Available: 
http://www.ornl.gov/~webworks/weather/Documents/WX00312.pdf. p. 40. 
5 Houthhakker, “Dynamic Demand Analysis.” p.250. 
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A Focus on Low-Income Households: Here and Now 
VULNERABILITY OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS TO PRICE VOLATILITY 
The observed response of low-income households to changes in energy prices 
further contributes to a sense of urgency regarding the formulation of policy 
interventions. Poor households are much more likely to respond to changes in energy 
prices with proportional changes in energy consumption, with reductions in response to 
higher prices representing a much higher proportion of baseline energy use than higher-
income households.6 The public health and quality of life implications of this are drastic 
in areas of the country prone to extreme weather, because the baseline energy use for 
low-income households is already disproportionately dedicated to climate control. The 
inability to make large capital purchases of more efficient appliances or climate control 
systems often leaves non-use of energy as the only option available to low-income 
households. 7 
IMPENDING RELEVANCE OF LOW-INCOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE POLICIES 
The question of how to effectively equip low-income households for a low-energy 
consumption lifestyle is increasingly relevant in the context of macroeconomic factors 
which are putting upward pressure on real energy costs. The fundamentals of supply and 
demand for residential electricity consumers are such that the burden of increased costs 
will be borne by ratepayers, and as energy prices increase a larger and larger share of the 
disposable income of households will be dedicated to the electricity bill. Whereas 
middle-income households typically spend less than 5% of their income on residential 
fuel costs, low income consumers spends 10-20% of their income on home utility bills. 8 
                                                 
6 Frieden, Bernard, and Kermit Baker. “Market Needs Help: The Disappointing Record of Home Energy 
Conservation.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 2. no. 3. (1983). p. 437. 
7 Ibid. p. 442. 
8 Houthhakker, “Dynamic Demand Analysis.” p.249. 
 14 
A full analysis of forecasted energy prices is far beyond the scope of this report, 
but a review of important trends is in order to underscore the importance of energy 
efficiency investments. Natural gas is the marginal price setting fuel source for most of 
the country‟s power markets, and it is by far the most volatile fuel source. 9 While there is 
rarely a consensus on price forecasts in commodity markets, prominent analysts are 
bullish on power prices due to a likely increase in natural gas prices and the forced 
retirement of a significant portion of the country‟s low-cost baseload coal plants. There is 
a healthy debate about the feasibility and affordability of alternative sources of energy, 
such as renewable and nuclear power, but the investment cycle of the power sector is 
long-term and even in the most optimistic scenarios the supply-side response to these 
developments will only mitigate a cost increase. 10 
A leading indicator of the effect of electricity price increases on low-income 
consumers is the example of heating oil price increases in the winter of 2011. The EIA 
updated its winter fuels outlook February to adjust to higher than expected prices, and 
consumers are expected to spend a record amount on heating by the end of the 6 month 
season11. Heating oil is derived from crude oil, which unlike power and natural gas is a 
commodity whose prices are driven by global supply and demand fundamentals. 
Increasing demand from the developing world has moved marginal supply to more 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9Energy Charter Secretariat. International Pricing Mechanisms for Oil and Gas. (Belgium: 2007). pp. 121-
122. 
10 Dizard, John. Coal Plants to be Snuffed Out Faster than Expected. Financial Times (June 26, 2010) 
11 Doggett, Tom. “Heating Oil Bills about $500 more than Last Winter.” Reuters, (Feb. 2011). Online. 
Available:  http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFN164584620110216. Accessed: February 20, 
2011 
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expensive sources of oil than ever before, which has directly impacted the costs of 
residential heating oil. 12  
As can be seen in Figure 1, there has been a definite increase in both the average 
price and volatility of heating oil prices over time. A common method to forecast fuel 
prices for less liquid commodities is to establish cointegration with a commodity that has 
strong trading volumes. 13 Crude oil is the most heavily traded energy commodity in the 
world, and the future price of heating oil can be interpolated from its futures prices. 14 
Crude and heating oil prices have maintained an equilibrium ratio of approximately 35:1 
over three decades, and a cursory glance at Figure 2 Demonstrates that the move strongly 
in tandem.  
Figure 1: Historical Heating Oil Prices15 
 
                                                 
12 Energy Information Administration. Residential Heating Oil Prices: What Consumers Should Know. 
Online. Available: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/heating_brochure/heatbro.htm. 
Accessed: February 2011 
13 Serletis, Apostolos and Ricardo Rangel-Ruiz. “Testing for Common Features in North American Energy 
Markets.” Energy Economics ,vol. 26, (2004), pp. 401-414 
14 Energy Charter Secretariat 2007, p. 99 
15 Energy Information Administration. Available online: http://eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm 
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Note that the prices have been logged in order to normalize their volatility in 
periods of extreme prices and to more appropriately demonstrate their equilibrium 
relationship. 17 Recent turmoil in oil-producing regions of the world and increasing 
demand from developing economies has been pushing the global price of oil ever higher, 
and as of late April NYMEX  petroleum commodity futures are sitting much higher for 
winter of 2011-2012 than they did for winter of 2010-2011.  
There is not a strong consensus regarding the future of North American gas 
prices, with analysts divided on the impact of new shale gas on the depth of supply of 
low-cost reserves. 18 Natural gas prices have been extremely volatile in recent years, as 
                                                 
16 Source: Energy Information Administration. Available online: 
http://eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm 
17 Nelson, Charles I. and Charles R. Plosser. “Trends and Random Walks in Macroeconomic Time Series.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics. vol. 10, (1982), pp. 139-162 
18 Financial Times, June 26, 2010 
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can be seen in Figure 3, and their most immediate impact in the lives of most residential 
customers is felt in the price of electric power. 




The fundamentals of the supply and demand of energy are highly complex and 
prices are difficult to forecast, but it may generally be said that conventional sources of 
energy are much more likely to become more rather than less expensive in coming years. 
In this context, the observed dynamic of low-income persons being particularly 
vulnerable to increases in energy prices lends an air of urgency to the effective 





                                                 
19 Source: Energy Information Administration. Available online: http://eia.gov/naturalgas/data.cfm 
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CHAPTER 3. ANALYZING BENEFITS FROM A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 
Complex social problems cannot be effectively tackled without a strategy 
grounded in a rigorous analytical framework. Raw data alone does not suggest a solution; 
performance metrics and benchmarks for success arise from a comprehensive theoretical 
context for optimizing the use of scarce resources. The traditional economic model whose 
entity of interest is the profit-seeking firm is parsimonious in its assumptions and lends 
itself to elegant formulations of equilibrium states and maximum value scenarios. In the 
context of policymaking, however, there are confounding factors which complicate the 
analysis. Competing objectives and difficult to define outcomes are the natural 
consequence of a broader definition of value and more expansive scope of interest, and 
this chapter is dedicated to reviewing how to appropriately apply cost-benefit analysis in 
a residential sustainability context.  
The Special Cases of CBA 
Cost benefit analysis for a government or nonprofit with a mission-driven focus 
on maximizing positive externalities is necessarily different from the case of a private 
firm. Opportunity cost and time preference, the core assumptions of CBA, are not as self-
evidently valid for the case of a benevolent public planner as opposed to a self-interested 
rational firm. Competitive equilibrium models are fashioned by logically positing the 
optimal choices of a representative agent maximizing present utility, whereas a 
benevolent, detached social planner is able to consider time varying preferences and will 
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give weight to future consumption, and thus in every case will operate with a lower 
discount rate than the representative agent. 20  
The classical efficient outcomes of competitive equilibrium encompass a much 
narrower set of possible resource deployments than is possible under a detached planning 
model, and theory would suggest that government and planning entities ought to enact 
policies with a bias towards future consumption in order to counteract the „tyranny of the 
present.‟ This sensitivity to time varying preference generally means that in comparison 
to private entities rational policy makers are more likely to favor resource conservation 
and savings than current consumption. 21 
DETERMINING AN APPROPRIATE DISCOUNT RATE 
In defining the rate that a detached planner would use, the „social discount rate,‟ it 
is important to examine the factors that are encompassed in a discount rate and consider 
the elements that are unique to a public planning perspective. First, the concept of risk is 
different for a public investment, when risk is spread amongst a large and diverse group 
of taxpayers 22. Expectations about the future are very different on a public planning scale 
than they are for individuals. Assumptions that future generations will be wealthy will 
tend to raise the discount rate, weighting current consumption more heavily, whereas 
expectations of stagnant or negative economic growth for an economy will encourage 
delayed consumption in the form of savings and investment. 23  
                                                 
20 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The Social Discount Rate. January 2001. Online. Available: 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/dp/dp137.pdf. p. 3. 
21 Ibid. pp. 14-15. 
22 New Zealand Treasury. Determining the Discount Rate for Government Projects. September 2002. 
Online. Available: https://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2002/02-21/twp02-
21.pdf. p. 4. 
23 Ibid. p. 5. 
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At its core, the operational use of the social discount rate is a representation the 
opportunity cost to society of spending. This is most appropriate for the analysis of public 
investments, and also the most straightforward to infer from other indicators in the 
economy. 24 The social discount rate in this case may be considered a function of time 
preference, which is the marginal rate of substitution of current and future consumption. 
25 This can be calculated in the same way that private firms calculate their weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC): 
 
WACC=(kb D/(D+E) +Ke E/(D+E)  
 
In this specification kb is the return on debt calculated based off of its yield in the 
market in order to demonstrate the cost of borrowing with debt, D is bonds outstanding 
and Ke is return on equity, calculated using CAPM, without taxation and E is equity 
outstanding. Note that this differs from the standard WACC specification in that it has 
been adjusted to reflect that governments do not pay corporate taxes. 26 This is a 
straightforward cost-based calculation of the discount rate, and given that the government 
does not conventionally issue equity the WACC model will logically be reduced to kb,  
the cost of government borrowing. 
The benefit of the WACC method is that it is most directly observable in the 
market, but given then „dictatorship of the present‟ concerns raised in the discussion of 
competitive equilibrium models it may be appropriate to use a more nuanced calculation 
of a social discount rate. The shadow price of capital, the offset consumption based on 
                                                 
24 Ibid. pp. 4-5. 
25 Ibid. p. 4.  
26 Ibid. pp. 8-9. 
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the allocation of capital to a particular project, is perhaps more appropriate, especially for 
a taxing entity. Unfortunately, the lack of a counterfactual for the allocation of resources 
in the absence of taxes means that the calculation of the social discount rate using this 
method will be fraught with uncertainty and political disputation. 27 
Another common critique of the WACC model is that it tends to exacerbate 
systemic risk when a firm applies it uniformly across all available projects. While WACC 
is calculated as above, the expected rate of return for a given project is based on its own 
inherent risk. 28 For the sake of simplicity, this can be illustrated by the example of a firm 
fully financed by debt with a borrowing cost of 4%, a reasonable analog to the United 
States government. Using the simple equation above for a tax-free firm the WACC of the 
government would be 4%, so a project with an expected rate of return in excess of 4% 
would be approved. The expected cash flows from an individual project should ideally be 
judged against the project‟s risk relative to the performance of the overall market, 
generally expressed as the correlation coefficient relative to the overall returns available 
in the market, β. Figure 4 plots the security market line of the expected rate of return over 
the β values for projects available to the government, using the risk-free rate of 4% as the 
market return. As a general principle, a project should be accepted if the net present value 
of its discounted cash flows are positive; that is, if the expected rate of return is positive 
given the risk of the project. As can be seen in Figure 4, there are projects with a positive 
internal rate of return that would be erroneously rejected by the firm and projects with 
negative rates of return that would be erroneously accepted. When an organization 
calculates a discount rate for the entire firm and applies it to all projects without rigorous 
                                                 
27 Ibid. pp. 6-7. 
28 Ross, Stephen A., Randolph W. Westerfield, Bradford D. Jordan. Essentials of Corporate Finance. New 
York: McGraw Hill, 2003 
 22 
analysis of the specific risks of the cash flows associated with it then over time the 
organization will not be expected to optimally benefit from the risks that it takes. 
Figure 4: Inefficiencies of Risk Management with Broad Application of WACC  
 
 
CBA AS USED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
In Circular A-94 he Office of Management and Budget periodically offers 
guidance for Federal programs in performing CBA that is useful for conceptualizing the 
inclusion of externalities and considering issues such as opportunity costs and the social 
discount rate. The guidance for public investments is that benefits and costs should 
always start with the „willingness to pay‟ metric of the competitive equilibrium model, 
and only incorporate other values with solid theoretical justification. 
OMB directs policymakers to consider „distributional‟ effects of any public 
investment decision based on the principle that a positive NPV economic event will result 
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in a scenario whereby those who benefit the most would be able to compensate those who 
lose value and still be better off than their initial condition. This assumption of non-zero-
sum creation of value is difficult to implement on the project-level for governments 
because the „losers‟ are millions of taxpayers who more likely than not are not direct 
beneficiaries of the created value. The purpose of taking distributional effects into 
account is to help ensure that the net value created by government activities is accrued by 
taxpayers across the economy is such as way that it exceeds the losses from taxation for 
the greatest number of taxpayers possible. Again, the absence of a counterfactual 
economic scenario obstructs the rigorous corroboration of the success or failure 
distributional efficiency. This policy goal presents the greatest challenge to social welfare 
spending that directly benefits those who do not generate significant tax revenue for the 
government, as is the case with subsidized low-income residential weatherization.  
The discount rate that the OMB currently mandates for public investments is 7%, 
which it claims is based on the opportunity cost of alternatively allocating funds in the 
private capital markets. It is interesting to note that this rate is significantly higher than 
that which would be implied by the WACC model, considering that the government‟s 
cost of debt is considerably lower, and by conventional risk-free based valuation 
procedures is at any point in time the lowest cost of borrowing in the market. 29 
Relevant to the assessment of the net benefits of weatherization and other 
sustainability investments is the guidance to especially consider the variability of 
assumed figures in cost-benefit calculations. OMB directs policymakers to primarily 
consult market data for volatility estimates and compose sensitivity analyses that take the 
                                                 
29 Office of Management and Budget. Circular A-094. Online. Available: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094/. Accessed:  February 12, 2011 
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underlying volatility into account. The net benefits of weatherization investments are 
highly sensitive to the price of energy, which is notoriously volatile.  
While CBA is a useful paradigm for policymakers, empirical evidence suggests 
that there are significant difficulties applying a rational actor model to predict the 
behavior of the residential energy consumer. Complete and accessible relevant 
information is a critical assumption of the rational actor model, but in the case of 
residential energy efficiency there are concerns both about the way that consumers 
perceive price and the way that this affects their choices. 30 
Limitations to the Representative Agent Assumption 
The fact that residential consumers do not generally know how to assess the costs 
and benefits of energy efficiency interventions is borne out in their observed behaviors31. 
In the absence of guidance or policy interventions residents will invest in efficiency 
interventions in order of increasing costs with inconsistent regard to the cost-benefit ratio 
of the intervention. 32 Furthermore, the time preference implicit in the discount rate 
suggested in the observed replacement of appliances with more efficient models is highly 
inconsistent, likely due to the fact that the largest consideration of personal utility in an 
appliance has more to do with its function than its energy use. 33  
RECONCILING OBSERVED BEHAVIOR WITH ECONOMIC THEORY 
In the parlance of microeconomics, the fact that consumers remain largely 
ignorant of the mechanics of the pricing of their energy would conventionally be 
attributed to high „search cost,‟ wherein the cost in time and resources of accessing 
                                                 
30 Stern. “Blind Spots.” p. 203. 
31 Frieden. “The Market Needs Help.” p. 442. 
32 Ibid. p. 445. 
33 Stern. “Blind Spots.” p. 209. 
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information about energy consumption would render the entire prospective efficiency 
project uneconomical. This concern would seem to be obviated in that total consumption 
and pricing information is provided to most consumers by the utility on a monthly basis. 
This suggests that the culprit is behavioral in nature, and has more to do with a subjective 
prior orientation regarding the amount of agency that a resident has over the cost of their 
energy use 34. This hypothesis is corroborated by observed behavior in the decision to 
purchase an energy audit. Even when the existence of a service is generally known 
amongst the ratepaying public the extent to which this service is pursued is driven more 
by outreach and promotion efforts of the sponsoring agency than by pricing or efficacy in 
producing real savings. 35 
The concerns raised in this chapter address both the application and the theory of 
cost benefit analysis, especially in the context of affecting residential energy 
consumption. In practical terms, the basic intuitive question that must be addressed is 
whether the resources allocated to a weatherization investment on behalf of a resident 
could be better spent on that resident‟s behalf. On this level the question is endemic to all 
government actions that are not directly involved in the creation of a tangible public 
good. In the absence of a strong justification more expansive that simple cost savings a 
government that invests in energy efficiency for a household is in effect purchasing an 
annuity on that households behalf. An investment judged solely on its cash flows is most 
appropriately discounted at a rate determined by the preference of the recipient of those 
cash flows, and in many cases it would make more sense to simply grant the principal of 
the investment to the resident.  
                                                 
34 Ibid. p. 204. 
35 Ibid. p. 211. 
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The two countervailing threads of reasoning to this argument are the critique of 
the time preference assumption of CBA in a policy context and the simple argument in 
favor of incorporating non-monetary benefits into an assessment of a project. The latter 
begs the question of program evaluation in general and exposes policymakers to a slew of 
subjective weighing mechanisms that cannot be assessed objectively or consistently. The 
former is technically elegant and consistent with the core definitions of value used in 
CBA, but practically is difficult to employ because it assumes knowledge by 
policymakers of a field of opportunities over time that in practice are speculative at best. 
The exception would be the case where policymakers had special knowledge of the field 
of relevant costs and benefits at certain points in the future that individual, self-interested 
economic actors either lack the knowledge to incorporate into their decision-making or 
are unable to asses within their constrained time horizon.   
Pursuing the latter thread of argument, the case for intervention by policymakers 
can be built either on establishing that they have access to a broader array of information 
than is generally available to the population of low-income residents and are thus 
justified in taking license to invest on their behalf, or that they are able to make 
investments that are erroneously rejected by the residents due to their inappropriately 
high time preference for consumption, as is outlined in Figure 4. The distinction may 
seem academic, but the policy implications of each view are starkly different. The case of 
policymakers having better information could be solved through education outreach 
initiatives, and the market for weatherization services would automatically achieve 
efficient outcomes through newly-informed consumers deciding to invest in efficiency 
interventions appropriate to their level of consumption. Utilities that offer rebates for 
efficient appliances are essentially operating under this framework of facilitating market 
equilibrium. The Weatherization Assistance Program targets low-income individuals, 
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however, and is acting under the framework that a project that cannot be justified by the 
implicit time preference for consumption of the client can still be justified by decoupling 
the analysis of value from the „tyranny of the present.‟  
The final issue to consider is whether the systemic destabilization dynamic 
accompanying a universally applied discount rate could affect governments as well as 
private firms. The first, most important distinction in this analysis is that a government 
generally does not rely on cash flow generated directly from its operating activities to 
remain solvent, so the threat of eventual bankruptcy due to an inappropriate risk 
management strategy is somewhat more remote. Whereas the cost of borrowing for a firm 
that continuously makes poor decisions would increase as it loses favor with investors, 
leading to a vicious cycle of both increased costs and a diminished field of profitable 
investment opportunities as the WACC line climbs higher, the credit standing of a 
government is not driven by the profitability of its activities and as such the cost of 
borrowing is relatively more stable.  
If inefficient allocation of public resources does not pose the same sort of 
existential threat to governments as it does to private firms it still represents an 
opportunity cost to beneficiaries of those resources. Given OMB‟s dictum to apply a 7% 
discount rate to the benefits of government spending without specific guidance as to how 
to account for the project-specific risks of those benefits it can be hypothesized that 
policymakers are erroneously implementing programs whose expected returns exceed 7% 
but whose level of uncertainty exceeds that return.  
The tools of risk management are highly developed in the energy sector, and it is 
simple to find a market proxy for the risk of an investment whose cash flows are driven 
by the cost of energy fuel commodities. Forecasted volatility in natural gas markets, for 
example, could be used to set project-specific risk for a residential weatherization project 
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that would save power, and volatility in oil markets could be used to determine the 
discount rate for a project that saves on heating oil. Rather than accepting the 7% one-
size-fits-all rate or speculating on the time preference of the average low-income 
consumer a weatherization project should be discounted based on the unique risk of its 



















CHAPTER 4. EXISTING EVALUATIVE METHODS 
Having addressed how to analyze information regarding the impact of 
weatherization services in a decision-making framework like CBA, we will now more 
closely examine methods used for generating the data on prospective benefits that may be 
included in the model. No matter how thorough a financial model, its outputs are only as 
good as the quality of its inputs, so creating strong estimates with well defined variances 
is critical to forecasting benefits and choosing between investment options. 
Establishing evaluative measures is the prerogative of the funding agency, and a 
variety of program evaluation regimes to assess sustainability investments have 
developed over the years. While there is much common ground between the regimes, 
there are key contrasts driven by the assumed size and sophistication of the implementing 
organization and the varying policy goals of the funding group.  
The Weatherization Assistance Program 
EFFICACY VS. POLITICS IN ALLOCATING FUNDS  
The largest sustainability investment program in the United States is the 
Weatherization Assistance program, a Federal program administered by the Department 
of Energy whereby states receive grants to invest in low-income residential 
weatherization. Initially created in 1976 with the goal of helping low income families 
reduce expenditures on energy and to reduce reliance on foreign sources of oil, its early 
funding allocations were seen to favor cold-weather states where home climate control 
expenses were primarily on residential heating oil. The disproportionate spending was 
challenged by Southern states, where residential indoor climate control expenditures are 
primarily on electric power for cooling, and in 1995 a new formulae was developed that 
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more equitably distributed funding based on a broader definition of residential energy 
expenditures. In order to not pull funding from states that had benefited from the previous 
formula, however, the new formula was not to be set in place until triggered by an annual 
budget exceeding $209.724M, a threshold that was not surpassed until the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) allocated $5B to the program in 2009. 36  
RECENT STEPS TO TIGHTEN EVALUATIVE MEASURES 
In 2006 the Department of Energy initiated the first full-scale evaluation of the 
Weatherization Assistance Program in approximately fifteen years37, and contracted with 
several independent agencies to collaborate with Oakridge National Laboratories to 
conduct a formal evaluation under the evaluative framework established by the W.K. 
Kellogg Foundation. The Kellogg Foundation‟s evaluation model seeks to balance the 
rigorous hypothesis testing of academic research and the empirical social sciences with 
planning and communication techniques that facilitate the continuous improvement of the 
program throughout the evaluation process. 38 A critical step in this process is the 
building of a „logic model‟ to conceptualize the operations of a program. 39 The 
components of this model are as follows: 
 Inputs- the human, capital, and material resources available to a program  
                                                 
36 Department of Energy. Weatherization Program Notice 09-1B. Online. Available: 
http://www.waptac.org/datas/files/wap_basics/wpn09-1bwapfinal031209.pdf. Accessed: February 2011. p. 
4. 
37 Oak Ridge National Laboratory. National Evaluation of the Weatherization Assistance Program: 
Preliminary Evaluation Plan for Program Year 2006. February 2007. Online. Available: 
http://weatherization.ornl.gov/pdfs/ORNL_CON-498.pdf. p.1. 
38 W. Kellogg Foundation. Evaluation Handbook. January 1998. Online. Available: 
http://ww2.wkkf.org/DesktopModules/WKF.00_DmaSupport/ViewDoc.aspx?fld=PDFFile&CID=281&Lis
tID=28&ItemID=2810770&LanguageID=0. pp. 5-7. 
 
39 Ibid. p. 11. 
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 Activities-the specific interactions of inputs that comprise the operations of 
the program being evaluated 
 Outputs-the immediate and direct results of the activities 
 Outcomes-the consequences of the outputs to the targeted groups on a 
granular level 
 Impact-an aggregate description of the outcomes that defines the overall 
mission of the program 40 
The exercise of building a logic model internally or with the collaboration of a 
funder allows both for the development of relevant criteria by which to assess an 











                                                 
40 W. Kellogg Foundation. Logic Model Development Guide. January 2004. Online. Available: 
http://ww2.wkkf.org/DesktopModules/WKF.00_DmaSupport/ViewDoc.aspx?fld=PDFFile&CID=281&Lis
tID=28&ItemID=2813669&LanguageID=0. p. 8. 
41 W. Kellogg Foundation. Evaluation Handbook. pp. 35-36. 
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Figure 5:Logic Model of the Weatherization Assistance Program 42 
 
 
The logic model of WAP distinguishes between the short-term, intermediate-term, 
and long-term outcomes of the organization‟s weatherization efforts. Short-term goals are 
largely related to the household-level benefits, intermediate-term goals expand the scope 
to include the development of the professional weatherization sector and reducing 
                                                 
42 Source: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. National Evaluation of the Weatherization Assistance 




emissions, and the long-term goals include the reduction in volatility of energy prices, a 
permanent weatherization industry, and community-level health impacts. 43 
 
MEASURING BENEFITS OF SUB-GRANTEES: THE ‘WAP ALGORITHM’ 
These high-level goals are implemented through the granting of funds to state-
level agencies, which in turn have been given wide latitude to institute oversight 
procedures over their sub-grantees. Grantees are tasked with allocating funds to sub-
grantee service providers and giving guidance on the allowable expenditures, which are 
designed using the criteria of maximizing the energy savings per dollar invested in terms 
of „energy savings‟ in British Thermal Units. 44 The method used to calculate these funds 
is referred to as the „WAP Algorithm‟, a proxy estimator with significant limitations.  
A review of publically available WAP Program Filing submissions, the annual 
update that state grantees submit to the Department of Energy, found that most states 
chose to use the „WAP Algorithm‟ rather than perform an original analysis. This is 
understandable, given the amount of labor hours required to collect and analyze data from 
utilities to test actual impacts on weatherized houses, or alternatively the amount of 
technical sophistication required for inferential methods of estimation.  
The development of the most recent iteration of the „WAP Algorithm‟ was based 
on a meta-analysis of studies of the efficacy of WAP-funded energy efficiency programs 
in 17 states and the District of Columbia and used ordinary least squares regression to 
                                                 
43 Oak Ridge National Laboratory. National Evaluation of the Weatherization Assistance Program: 
Preliminary Evaluation Plan for Program Year 2006. February 2007. Online. Available: 
http://weatherization.ornl.gov/pdfs/ORNL_CON-498.pdf. p. 13. 
 
44 National Energy Technology Laboratory. Weatherization Formula Grants American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Funding Opportunity Number: DE-FOA-0000051. Online. Available: 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/pdfs/wap_recovery_act_foa.pdf. Accessed February 2011. p. 40. 
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determine the drivers for energy savings. 45 It was intended to replace an earlier 
formulation that was based on the weighted average savings of two state studies that 
specified an energy savings of approximately 31.7 mmBtu per household. The 
assumptions of this regression technique are that the covariates are linear in their 
relationship to the independent variable, the variance of the discrepancy between the 
estimated and observed values is constant over the range of the covariates, and that these 
discrepancies are normally distributed. 46 The initial model specifies natural gas energy 
savings as the dependent variable, and pre-weatherization energy usage, square footage 
of the home, heating degree days, and per-household weatherization expenditures as the 
explanatory variables. 47  
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ‘WAP ALGORITHM’ 
The difficulty in using a small sample for this sort of regression is that the 
estimated parameters, while unbiased, are not of minimum variance48. This creates an 
issue for hypothesis testing, which relies on demonstrating that a specified area of the 
estimated range for a parameter does include zero, and the likelihood of generating a type 
II error, or „false negative‟, is increased. 49  
In this case, the limitations of regression are compounded by the attempt to use 
several covariates to explain the energy savings as a result of WAP. The classical 
multivariate OLS model assumes no covariance between the explanatory covariates, 
                                                 
45 Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Estimating the National Effects of the U.S. Department of Energy’s 
Weatherization Assistance Program with State-Level Data: A Metaevaluation Using Studies from 1993 to 
2005. September 2005. Online. Available: http://weatherization.ornl.gov/pdfs/ORNL_CON-493.pdf. pp. 5-
6. 
46 Gujarait, Damodar, and Dawn C. Porter. Basic Econometrics: Fifth Edition. (Singapore: McGraw Hill, 
2009). pp. 97-102) 
47 Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Estimating the National Effects. p. 5. 
48 Gujarati, p. 828. 
49 Ibid. p. 121. 
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otherwise the ability to estimate the minimum-variance parameters in confounded and the 
variance of parameter estimates is inflated. 50 Intuitively, however, one would see that 
there is a direct relationship between the explanatory variables specified in the above 
model. The annual amount of natural gas used to warm a home is directly related to the 
size of the home as well as the number of days of the year where the climate requires the 
home to be heated. Furthermore, the amount of money spent on weatherization would be 
directly related to the size of the home.  
The implementers of the study were seeking a general algorithm by which to 
estimate the impact of weatherization across the United States, and thus made the 
decision to drop any covariates whose parameters were not deemed to be statistically 
significant from zero. As a consequence, after several iterations of regression and re-
specification of the model the final algorithm specified that the only explanatory 
covariate for energy savings was the pre-weatherization energy savings: 
 
Annual Natural Gas Savings (mmBtu)= -10.833+(0.311*pre-weatherization 




This model may be interpreted to say that the energy savings for a weatherized 
home are a direct linear function of the energy used prior to weatherization, with a 
marginal annual savings of .0311 mmBtu per mmBtu of usage pre-weatherization.  
The authors did not include diagnostics to test assumptions of normality and 
constant variance of the error terms, but such diagnostics are difficult with a small 
sample. The important consequence of this is the inability to test for systematic patterns 
                                                 
50 Ibid. p. 181.  
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in the error terms that would provide clues as to the important omitted variables. The sum 
of squared error comprises 61% of the total variance of the variance of energy savings in 
this model; the implicit assumption that this is white noise is not corroborated and highly 
suspect.  
In order to generalize the model the authors use the assumption of 133 mmBtu as 
the baseline natural gas consumption for a US household, and thus the estimated savings 
provided by the algorithm is 30.5 mmBtu per year per household. 51 Having a constant, 
nationwide estimate for the savings generated by weatherization funded by WAP is 
politically safe and administratively simple, however the implicit assumption that the 
only systematic driving factor of energy savings is initial energy usage, and that all other 
factors are randomly geographically distributed defies logic. The most apparent example 
of bias inherent in this specification is the distribution of „heating degree days‟, the 
number of days per year below 65
o 
F. This is directly related to geography, with many 
fewer heating degree days in southern states, and energy usage in southern states is 
consequently much lower during the winter.    
Another problem with this specification is the adequacy of the definition of 
„energy savings‟; it does not take into account the energy benefits for cooling, which 
would be measured in kWh or mmBtu-equivalents of electricity rather than mmBtu of 
natural gas. In areas with more cooling degree days than heating degree days the 
principal savings would be measured in terms of electric power, whereas this algorithm is 
derived exclusively from pre- and post-weatherization natural gas usage. As a proxy for 
energy savings from states with large number of cooling degree days and significant 
electric power expenditures during the summer, as is the case in southern states, this 
                                                 
51 Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Estimating the National Effects. p. 7. 
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algorithm is entirely inadequate. Other assumptions, such as the random distribution of 
households with regards to size and non-systematic geographic distributions of labor and 
materials costs would likewise not be expected to withstand rigorous scrutiny.  
In spite of these shortcomings, this algorithm is used by many states to report 
their energy savings to WAP. For example, Texas, Virginia, and Michigan all reported 
energy savings of 30.5 mmBtu per household, and Hawaii and New Hampshire both used 
the 31.7 mmBtu per household of the earlier formulation. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
The development of a new algorithm is expected as a result of the aforementioned 
study being performed by a consortium of groups lead by Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, the source of the existing algorithm. As part of the national evaluation of 
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February 2011 




54 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Energy Affairs Administration. American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act Weatherization Assistance Program State Plan. May 2009. Online. 
Avaialble:http://www.pr.gov/NR/rdonlyres/71AF1CB4-397B-4CB6-9206-
FFBF2094A373/35455/StatePlan20195500.pdf. Accessed: February 2011 
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Available:http://hawaii.gov/labor/ocs/pdf/HI%20ARRA%20WAP%20Annual%20File%20WinSAGA-
Revised%207-15-09.pdf. Accessed: February 2011 
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le.pdf. Accessed: February 2011 
59 Department of Energy. Weatherization Annual File Worksheet: North Carolina 2009. Online. Available: 
http://blog.news-record.com/staff/green/NCweatherizationapplicationMay2009.pdf. Accessed: February 
2011 
60 Department of Energy. Weatherization Annual File Worksheet: Missouri 2009. Online. Available: 
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WAP a sampling is currently underway that will use billing data from 2009-2011 in order 
to infer the direct impacts of weatherization on household energy expenditures. 61 
The monitoring requirements for grantees include the inspection of at least 5% of 
the residences which have been weatherized using WAP funds and ensuring that 
expenditures are within the allowable range per serviced home as outlined by their 
approved budgeting procedures. 62 The principal accountability responsibilities of the 
sub-grantees are quarterly reports that include information such as the number of 
households and persons helped by demographic characteristics, fuel and energy type 
usage by household, outlays and hours worked. 63 
THE FUTURE OF THE ALGORITHM 
With the ARRA in 2009, colloquially referred to as the „Stimulus Act‟, the 
reporting requirements for grantees were notably expanded. The unprecedented increase 
in funding for the program was accompanied by a perceptible shift in the emphasis of its 
goals. New reporting requirements included capital expenditures in excess of $5000 and 
the number and type of jobs created or retained. 64 The notable emphasis of WAP 
oversight from the Department of Energy is fiscal management, and with the ARRA 
expansion the priority has expanded to include training and employment.  
Monetization of benefits such as energy savings is not expected of sub-grantees, 
nor is the collection of empirical data on home energy usage.  Certainly this information 
is difficult to collect and interpret; even amongst professional energy analysts the 
                                                 
61 Oak Ridge National Laboratory. National Evaluation. pp. 25-28. 
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63 Department of Energy. Weatherization Program Notice 10-13A. Online. Available: 
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methods are disputed. Regardless, the attempt to use a universal algorithm with only one 
parameter to report energy usage across the country is highly problematic and cannot be 
taken seriously as representative of the actual benefits of WAP.  
PRISM: Princeton Scorekeeping Model 
The gold standard for energy-savings calculations in analyzing the efficacy of 
weatherization is the Princeton Scorekeeping Model, commonly referred to as PRISM. It 
is a statistical method for determining the fuel savings for a particular intervention or a 
sampling of interventions, and is able to demonstrate actual consumption changes over 
time by directly controlling for the relationship between fuel consumption and ambient 
temperature. 65  
The specific advantages of PRISM over other methods, such as the WAP 
algorithm, is that it is directly derived from empirical observations of a building or set of 
buildings, has been deemed to be reliable through demonstrated validations of the model, 
and generates a standardized score that facilitates meaningful cost-benefit-analyses or 
efficacy comparisons. 66  
SPECIFICATION OF PRISM 
The inputs for PRISM are a vector of billing data for a house or for samples of 
houses and corresponding ambient temperatures for certain intervals of time, and the 
dependent variable is the fuel consumption. Its simplest form is for a heating-only 
weatherization project, and is formally specified as follows. 67 
                                                 
65 Fels, Margaret F. “PRISM: An Indroduction.” Energy and Buildings, vol. 9, no. 5. (1986). 
PRISM (http://www.princeton.edu/~marean/publications/prism_intro.pdf). p. 6. 
 
66 Ibid. p. 2. 
67 Ibid. p. 1. 
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  f=α+β(τ-T)+ 
Where f is fuel consumption, α is the baseline energy consumption for a 
household, τ is the desired target temperature within the household, T is the ambient 
temperature, and „+‟ indicates that the difference term is non-negative, bounded by zero. 
The value of interest for users of the model is the normalized annual consumption 
(NAC), which is a function of heating-degree days in a given year. Fi is the average fuel 
consumption for a given period, and Hi(τ) is the average heating degree days for a given 
period. Heating degree days for a given period is calculated as follows: 
  Hi(τ)= (τ-Tij)+/Ni 
Where N is the number of days in the given period. Given these inputs the model 
for a given building is specified using ordinary least squares linear regression: 
  Fi=α+β Hi(τ)+ϵ 
Where ϵ is the normal error term with constant variance. One year of data is 
sufficient to calculate this model, after which the parameters may be applied to forecast 
the NAC: 
 NAC=365α+ β Hi(τ) 
Once derived it may be used to project the efficacy of specific interventions with 
any scenario of forecasted temperature values and heating base for a given year. 68 The 
value of the PRISM model is that the statistical techniques are fairly straightforward and 
subject to the conventional diagnostics of linear models. It is important to note that the 
interpretation of these parameters is sensitive to the accuracy of τ , the indoor temperature 
target, a value which in fact may have a significant degree of variance, especially in 
homes where thermostats are controlled by human decisions rather than in large, 
                                                 
68 Ibid. p. 10. 
 41 
automated buildings 69. It is also possible that for individual residences the different 
usage of heating infrastructure at different times, such as weekdays versus weekends or 
vacation periods, will skew the parameter estimates if not managed in the data gathering 
period.  
EXPANDING FOR MORE THAN ONE FUEL TYPE 
While the creators of PRISM do not elaborate on the topic, they do suggest that a 
significant advantage of the NAC index is that it given that it may be expanded to include 
cooling as well as heating. Given that building cooling is done electrically and heating is 
generally done through gas or heating oil combustion the NAC will need to be specified 
in terms of heat-content equivalents of whatever unit the energy consumed is measured 
in, such as converting kWh to equivalent mmBtu. 70 A proposed specification of the 
model for both heating and cooling savings is as follows: 
  f=α+β1(τ1-T)+ + β2(T -τ2)+ 
Wherein the initial terms are specified as above in the heating-only model, but the 
second covariate term is representative of cooling-degree days. The relationship between 
the outdoor temperature and the target temperature for cooling degree days is opposite of 
what it is for heating degree days, and remains a non-negative term bounded by zero. It 
should be noted that the values for τ, the targeted indoor temperature, do not necessarily 
need to be equivalent for the calculation of heating-degree and cooling-degree terms. It is 
reasonable to assume, however, that τ2 is greater than τ1 in a rational climate control 
system, such that the heating and cooling units are never simultaneously deployed.  
                                                 
69 Ibid. p. 8. 
70 Ibid. p. 14. 
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TECHNICAL ISSUES WITH INTERPRETING AND USING PRISM 
A new concern raised by this multivariate specification is that the explanatory 
covariates are directly negatively correlated, raising the dreaded statistical specter of 
multicollinearity. This need not be an issue of concern for the reliability of the calculation 
of NAC, however, although it even further confounds the ability to meaningfully interpret 
the component parameters of the model. Multicollinearity in ordinary least squares 
models will not bias the coefficients, but it will not allow for their efficient estimate and 
tend to report higher standard errors. The consequence of this is that baseline energy 
usage (α) and the exact marginal fuel usage for heating and cooling (β1, β2) cannot be 
reliably estimated, although overall standardized energy consumption over a period of 
time may be modeled. 
The two possible uses of the PRISM model are to attempt to determine the exact 
change in energy consumption patterns before and after an intervention in a single 
structure or to calculate a change in the overall NAC in the pre-weatherization versus the 
post-weatherization periods.  
In the first case, the parameters may be subject to the standard diagnostic and 
hypothesis testing procedures for ordinary least squares regression. The example given by 
PRISM is to compare the α value, or the baseline, non-climate control energy usage of a 
building, for models run before and after the installation of a water heater jacket. Such a 
test may be specified as 
 H0: αpre= αpost 
 H0: αpre> αpost 
The creators of the model caution against this, however. First, the assumption that 
the parameters of energy use are constant over time does not hold true in reality. 71 For 
                                                 
71 Ibid. p. 11. 
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example, plugging in a new appliance would significantly affect α, and standard wear and 
in a heating system will tend to increase the value of β. Furthermore, the assumed 
constant value of τ confounds the methods of ordinary least squares to generate 
parameters that are physically interpretable as actual proxies for energy use, although the 
overall estimate of NAC remains robust. 72  
Another issue to consider in hypothesis testing is that temperature data is highly 
autocorrelated, such that there tend to be significant runs in the data and a high degree of 
seasonality in energy use. The problem with using ordinary least squares regression with 
autocorrelated data is that the standard error of parameter estimates is artificially 
underestimated, leading to a risk of type-I error. 73 If autocorrelation is not accounted for 
then the parameter estimates for α and β would be unbiased but erroneously sharp, and 
tighter variances would exaggerate the differences between pre and post weatherization 
models. However, because the parameter estimates remain unbiased the estimate for 
NAC still remains reliable, although forecasting becomes a technically more complex 
endeavor.  
For both of these reasons PRISM should not be used for testing hypothesis related 
to the specific components of physical energy usage of the household, but it is still a very 
useful tool for understanding the overall changes in energy consumption. The 
recommended metrics for savings are the absolute or percent change in the NAC from the 
pre and post intervention periods.  
 Sraw=NACpre-NACpost 
 Sraw%=[(NACpre-NACpost  )]/ NACpre]*100 
                                                 
72 Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
73 Gujarati. pp. 747-748 
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The best use of PRISM is to test a sample and control group of houses to 
determine the effect of weatherization. The developers recommend using the standard 
error of the mean to perform hypothesis test on NAC for groups of buildings. 74 This 
formulation lends itself to standard difference-in-difference testing, wherein ordinary 
least squares is performed on a model specified to account both for the effects of the 
treatment, control for differences in initial conditions of the treatment and control groups, 
and also control for the secular changes in energy consumption, providing a legitimate 
counterfactual so as to completely isolated effects of weatherization. The data would be 
specified in „long form‟, such that each house has two observations, and clustered by 
house, neighborhood, or city. 
This counterfactual is particularly important for weatherization, given that the 
variance in energy consumption due to minor alterations in a structure, such as caulking 
or insulation, will be extremely small compared to the proportion of variance of energy 
consumption that may be attributed to climate control efforts that are driven directly by 
changes in weather. An easy way of conceptualizing this is to say that the energy 
consumption of weatherized houses in a given neighborhood will look more alike to the 
energy consumption of non-weatherized houses of the same type within their 
neighborhood that they will to weatherized houses, even of the same type, in a different 
part of the country.  
PRE-POST TREATMENT INTERPRETATION OF PRISM PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
The difference-in-difference model for a treatment group of weatherized 
structures and a control group of non-weatherized structures would be performed by 
                                                 
74 Fels. p. 12. 
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estimating the NAC for each in appropriately substantial periods, preferably a year, 
before and after the weatherization event.  
 
 NAC=β0+ βweatherization+ βpost+ βweatherization*post 
 
 Each explanatory covariate is a binary variable. The component variables 
treatment and post indicate whether the measurement is from the treatment or control or 
in the pre or post period, respectively, and the interaction term for the two is the 
difference-in-difference term that isolates the effect of weatherization. The coefficients 
are easily interpreted when organized into a difference-in-difference matrix: 
 
Table 1: Difference-in-Difference Grid for NAC 
 








βpost+ βweatherization*post βpost+βweatherization*post 
Control β0 β0+ βpost βpost 
Difference βweatherization 
βweatherization*post
+ βweatherization βweatherization*post 
  
A hypothesis test to corroborate the efficacy of weatherization would examine 
whether βweatherization*post  is statistically significantly different from zero. The advantage of 
using the difference-in-difference method as opposed to a simply test of the changes in 
energy consumption is that the variance in the change in consumption that is driven by 
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weather and other systematic factors is captured in the coefficient for the explanatory 
covariate „post‟ and not erroneously attributed to weatherization. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for the explanatory covariate ‘weatherization‟ may be used to capture any 
differences in initial energy consumption between the treatment and control groups. 
Ideally, randomization would obviate this concern, but with this specification the 
assumption is automatically tested in whether the coefficient is significantly different 
from or equal to zero. 
MONETIZING THE OUTPUTS OF PRISM  
 The creators of PRISM stress that the NAC is best used as an index of 
consumption to estimate the efficacy of energy efficiency interventions and not as a 
forecasting tool for specific components of energy consumption75. Perhaps its most 
significant contribution to the field of low-income weatherization is that, as opposed to 
other evaluative models, its inputs are so simple that the model may be composed and 
interpreted with little formal training in analytical methods and no training in engineering 
or architecture. 
Of course, the primary concern for those interested in low-income weatherization 
is the question of actual savings in terms of monetary expenditures rather than mmBtus. 
Incorporating pricing into any standardized index of energy savings is tricky because 
prices vary significantly over a given. Additionally, pricing per unit of energy is 
extremely variable given the type of fuel, and price volatility is much higher for certain 
forms of energy, such as electricity in areas with natural gas as the marginal price setting 
fuel, and relatively stable in a given period for other forms, such as coal and residential 
heating oil.  
                                                 
75 Ibid. p.14. 
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For these reasons determining pricing for the multivariate NAC model is more 
problematic than for the bivariate NAC model. In the latter case the average price per 
mmBtu over the given period multiplied by the NAC may give the best standardized 
expenditure indicator, and for the former an average price weighted by energy 
consumption would be appropriate. The biggest shortfall of this method is that it does not 
capture the important microeconomic dynamic that energy consumption correlates 
directly with energy prices, so weighting prices by consumption over the period in which 
NAC is estimated would be necessary to generate the relevant expenditure metric.    
Consideration of Cost Estimates for CBA 
The issue of labor costs for weatherization program have been a significant source of 
controversy, weighing issues of workforce development and fair wages against 
maximizing the impact of service delivery to low-income households. Weatherization 
services vary widely in their complexity, ranging from a large amount of low-skilled light 
carpentry sealing tasks to services such as energy auditing that require formal training 
and certification from the Building Performance Institute. This is further complicated by 
the fact that sub-grantees of WAP are often nonprofit human service agencies as opposed 
to professional construction firms, and thus lack internalized core competencies for 
construction personnel management 76.  
Historically, the Weatherization Assistance Program has been exempt from 
Davis-Bacon Act requirements that federally-funded positions pay the prevailing wage 
for whatever services are procured. This changed with the expansion of funding under 
ARRA, which required that all stimulus-related programs adhere to Davis-Bacon 
                                                 
76 Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Nonenergy Benefits from the Weatherization Assistance Program: A 
Summary of Findings from the Recent Literature. April 2002. Available:  
http://www.ornl.gov/~webworks/cppr/y2001/rpt/113893.pdf. pp. 2-3. 
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standards 77.  A complication of this was that the lack of a vibrant private residential 
weatherization sector outside of previously exempt WAP programs made finding 
comparable wages on a county-level difficult for many regions, and in most cases the 
prevailing wages for professional construction work was initially used to set the Davis-
Bacon wage 78. While the expansion to WAP under ARRA was passed in February of 
2009 the Davis-Bacon revisions for weatherization worker wages were not issued until 
December of that year, to which many delays in state implementations of the program 








                                                 
77 Department of Labor. FA-TC-0050: Davis-Bacon Act Requirements. Online. Available: 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/pdfs/dba_clauses_weatherization.pdf. Accessed: February 2011. p. 2.  
78 Ibid. pp. 2-3. 
79 Department of Energy. Energy Efficiency and Weatherization Block Grants Program Notice 10-012. 
Online. Available: 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/pdfs/eecbg_guidance_not_using_wap_rates_05062010.pdf. pp. 2-3. 
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CHAPTER 5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Final Thoughts on Using CBA Methods 
UNCERTAIN ACCRUAL OF BENEFITS DUE TO INTERVENTIONS 
Having established methods to effectively estimate the benefits of intervention 
packages, we must consider who the targeted recipient of these benefits may be. The 
application of CBA assumes a single representative agent to whom the benefits of a 
program will accrue, presumably a single low-income household. In the case of home-
owning families the assumption is warranted; realistically, however, property ownership 
and housing patterns of our target constituency may affect our ability to definitively 
support this assumption. There are two major concerns that arise from the possibility of 
transient housing behavior in our target population. 
First off, policymakers must determine whether the goal of a program is to benefit 
a particular low-income family, or generally to benefit families that are low-income at a 
given point in time. Energy efficiency investments in a residential unit designated for 
low-income tenants will serve the latter goal, and may be sufficient to justify public 
expenditures.  
The second concern is not so easily allayed, however. It is possible, especially in 
an environment of increasing energy costs, that the housing market will place a premium 
on housing that includes weatherized and efficient amenities, in which case spillover 
benefits of increased asset values with accrue to the owner of the property. This is 
generally a secondary policy concern, however if the property owner is then able to 
extract higher rents due to this market premium weatherization for rental units may have 
the perverse effect of subsidizing the income of property owners and reducing the 
available affordable stock of housing for low-income families. For this reason it is 
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reasonable for weatherization funds to be allocated exclusively to housing designated for 
low-income residents.  
DEFINING AN APPROPRIATE DISCOUNT RATE 
In practice, low-income families operate as economic agents with very high 
discount rates, such that present consumption is highly favored over future consumption. 
As discussed previously, policymakers have the prerogative to overcome this „tyranny of 
the present‟ by taking a non-time varying view of benefits, however the problem still 
remains as to how a benefit allocated over time ought to be compared to a benefit today.  
Using the framework of „net cost‟ defined in the introduction, I would suggest 
that policymakers develop a discount rate based first on a risk-free rate stet by the 
alternative view of a hurdle rate defined by the offset cost of living to a household were 
the cash allocated for the weatherization intervention instead given as a direct subsidy 
over the expected lifetime of the intervention. If the net cost of living for a household 
were to be higher under the direct cash transfer scenario, then the intervention is justified. 
This view of cash flow analysis avoids the issue of time preference altogether and is more 
directly based in the conceivable alternatives available to policymakers than cost-of-
capital methods of discount-rate determination. As suggested in Chapter 3, this rate 
should be adjusted by the relative risk of a project based on the volatility of the relevant 
fuel commodity. 
Low-Hanging Fruit: Nationwide Regional Benefit Estimate 
USING EXISTING DATA TO SPECIFY PRISM 
A model for the estimation of benefits to low-income households of 
weatherization programs is entirely possible using existing data. The Weatherization 
Assistance Program has information on the types of houses and specific interventions 
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used by their subgrantees for decades, and the amount of data has increased significantly 
in the past several years due to ARRA-funded expansion. This information may be 
segmented by housing type and intervention type to create a set of scenarios for each 
climactic region of the country.  
The final piece of the puzzle that heretofore has not been available is the data on 
consumption, but the challenge here is more administrative than technical. Every utility 
has comprehensive consumption data for every customer for the lifetime of the account, 
and they already use this data to determine load forecasts and schedule power capacity. 
By taking relatively small samples for each housing and intervention scenario in question 
and matching them with two years of utility data, one prior to weatherization and one 
post-weatherization, the Department of Energy can fully run the PRISM model and create 
specific NAC estimates for every array of housing type and intervention option in each 
state. 
As outlined in Chapter 4, the NAC differentials can be paired with energy pricing 
assumptions to forecast the monetary value of an intervention. A reliable, empirically 
valid CBA model can then be constructed in order to determine a regionally optimized 
most effective set of intervention options as well as to support the political argument for 
an economically efficient rather than politically equivalent allocation of public resources 
throughout the regions of the country.  
The primary barrier so far to this sort of analysis has been a lack of interagency 
cooperation, such that the Department of Energy administers the Weatherization 
Assistance Program without necessary cooperation of local utilities. While utilities may 
often argue that their load data is proprietary and that the release of individual account 
information violates privacy, the Department of Energy is capable of ensuring anonymity 
both for firms and ratepayers. After initial matching the dataset can be scrubbed of all 
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information that may be used to identify households without at all affecting the quality of 
the analysis, and the sample sizes in question are so small as to be useless in the 
determination of information sensitive to competitive concerns in power markets. 
RESIDUAL CONCERN: SUBSTITUTION AND SUBJECTIVE UTILITY 
The final concern to be addressed with this proposed analysis is the substitution 
affect that may be expected due to the high price elasticity of demand for energy 
observed in low-income households. Should actual consumption be increased due to the 
expected higher utility per rate of unit of energy with weatherization then the 
conventional, NAC-only specification of the PRISM model will underestimate the 
benefits. The developers of PRISM indicate that the use of data from one year before and 
one year after the intervention will minimize the measurement issues caused by this 
consumption adjustment affect. The only empirically valid way to measure this 
adjustment affect would be to use as a control group a set of households who have been 
mislead into believing that they have received weatherization services and measure any 
erroneous consumption adjustment; the ethical problems with this are obvious.  
Concluding Comments 
Policy economics is often besieged by the principal-agent problem, whereby sub-
optimal economic scenarios are enacted because decision makers do not bear the cost of 
misallocation of resources, and thus a rigorous framework for verifying benefits is 
critical. This professional report addressed both the theoretical foundations for applying 
decision modeling techniques to sustainability investment decisions in the context of low-
income housing as well as technical issues in empirically establishing the benefits of such 
investments.  
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As commodity prices outpace the recovery of spending power for US households 
the question of how to support families burdened with excessive utility costs becomes 
ever more relevant, and as the consequences of global climate change become more 
apparent the urgency of developing efficient modes of consumption is sharpened.  
In the last century the world has undergone a radical transformation in terms of 
how we use the resources to provide for our everyday lives. Mass migration to cities, 
accompanied by changes in transportation and agriculture, the ubiquitous spread of 
energy-dependent communication technology, and tremendous advances in technology 
have completely altered the economic and social environment. As the availability of 
resources shifts and technology continues to advance it may be expected that the next 
century will witness similar exciting changes for the human condition. I look forward to 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
ARRA: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
CBA: Cost Benefit Analysis 
kWh: Kilowatt Hours, a measure of electric energy quantity 
mmBtu: Million British Thermal Units, measure of energy content 
MR-GO: Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet 
WACC: Weighted Average Cost of Capital 

















Jacob Wayne Steubing is from San Antonio, Texas. He studied Sociology at 
Loyola University New Orleans and worked for Catholic Charities until 2008. He 
attended the LBJ School of Public Affairs and the McCombs School of Business at the 
University of Texas at Austin. 
 
Permanent Email Address: jacob.steubing@gmail.com 
This report was typed by Jacob Wayne Steubing 
